The mandatory private pension pillar in Hungary: An Obituary by Simonovits, András
 
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
BUDAPEST, 2011 
 
MT-DP – 2011/12 
 
 
 
 
The Mandatory Private Pension 
Pillar in Hungary: An Obituary 
 
 
ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS
  
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2011/12 
 
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments. 
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
The Mandatory Private Pension Pillar in Hungary: An Obituary 
 
 
Author: 
 
 
 
András Simonovits 
research advisor 
Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
E-mail:  simonov@econ.core.hu 
 
 
 
March 2011 
 
ISBN 978-615-5024-43-6 
ISSN 1785 377X 
 The Mandatory Private Pension Pillar in Hungary: 
An Obituary 
 
András Simonovits 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 1998, the left-of-center government of Hungary carved out a second pillar mandatory 
private pension system from the original mono-pillar public system. Participation in the 
mixed system was optional for those who were already working, but mandatory for new 
entrants to the workforce. About 50 per cent of the workforce joined voluntarily and 
another 25 per cent were mandated to do so by law between 1999 and 2010. The private 
system has not produced miracles:  either in terms of the financial stability of the social 
security system, or greatly improved social security in old age. Moreover, the international 
financial and economic crisis has highlighted the transition costs of pre-funding. Rather 
than rationalizing the system, the current conservative government de facto “nationalized” 
the second pillar in 2011 and is to use part of the released capital to compensate for tax 
reductions. 
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 Kötelező magánnyugdíj-pillér Magyarországon: 
Gyászjelentés 
 
Simonovits András 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
1998-ban a balközép magyar kormány kihasított egy második pillért (a kötelező 
magánnyugdíj-rendszert) az eredetileg monopilléres társadalombiztosítási rendszerből.  
A vegyes rendszerben való részvétel önkéntes volt a már munkában állóknak, de kötelező 
volt az újonnan belépőknek. A dolgozóknak mintegy 50%-a csatlakozott önként, majd 
további 25%-a kötelezően 1999 és 2010 között. A magánnyugdíj-rendszer nem produkált 
csodákat, sőt, a nemzetközi pénzügyi és gazdasági válság reflektorfénybe helyezte a 
tőkésítés átmeneti költségeit. A konzervatív kormányzat – ahelyett, hogy racionalizálta 
volna a rendszert – valójában államosította a második pillért 2011-re, és a felszabaduló 
tőkét részben adócsökkentésre használja fel. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The partial or full privatization of the pension system with pre-funding has been advocated 
by many economists, but the World Bank (1994) has had the most decisive impact on the 
actual reforms performed in Latin America and East-Central Europe (Müller, 1999 and 
2003; Fultz, 2002; Schmähl and Horstmann, 2002). The underlying ideas behind such a 
structural reform were as follows: privatization with pre-funding i) significantly raises the 
level of savings, especially long-term savings, ii) enhances incentives to work and report 
earnings, iii) diversifies risks, iv) weakens the adverse impact of long-term population 
ageing, and v) increases the possibility of making investments in countries with young 
populations. 
With a certain delay, the theoretical critique of the so-called paradigmatic pension 
reform has appeared in the literature (e.g. Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001; World Bank, 2006; 
Diamond and Orszag, 2005 and Barr and Diamond, 2008): i) mandatory private pension 
savings crowd-out voluntary savings for higher-paid workers and are difficult to achieve 
for those who are lower-paid; ii) the incentives to work and report earnings do not change 
significantly, because the weight of the private pillar is not large enough and the 
accompanying tax increases neutralize the remaining incentives; iii) yields and earnings 
are strongly correlated, undermining the force of diversification; iv) a dropping birth rate 
weakens real yields, while increasing life expectancy decreases annual private benefits the 
same way as it does for public benefits; and v) countries with young populations can ill-
afford foreign direct investment and capital export increases the gross foreign debt of the 
exporting country. 
Between 1998 and 2004 most ex-communist countries (notable exceptions were the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia) carved out the so-called “second pension pillar” from the 
original mono-pillar public system, but during the recent international financial and 
economic crisis some of them (the Baltic Republics) temporarily suspended its 
functioning. At the end of 2010, a former front-runner, Hungary, not only suspended 
private contributions but essentially closed down the second pillar completely.1 This article 
will describe and analyze the processes that lead to the rise and fall of the second pillar in 
Hungary.2 
                                                        
1 The present article makes extensive use of five earlier articles (Simonovits, 1999, 2001, 2008, 
2009 and 2011). 
2 A subjective remark is necessary. This author has never been a proponent of the second pillar, but 
rejects and protests against its current destruction (which has left only 3 per cent of the original 
affiliated members in the second pillar associations) as illegitimate, irrational and subversive. 
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 What were the basic factors that called for the creation of the second pillar in Hungary 
in 1998? Before 1998, the country had a universal and progressive public pension system 
that provided the bulk of support in old age for the bulk of the pensioners.3 Note, however, 
that the World Bank has called into question the redistribution provided by such 
progressivity, claiming “that upper-income people enter the labor force later in life and live 
longer after retirement, so they contribute less, receive more than lower-income people 
[per dollar] over a lifetime” (1994, p. 131). 
By 1995, a broad consensus was in agreement that the Hungarian pension system 
needed important reform. With the type of reform that was chosen in Hungary, a 
significant – though not dominant – share of the revenues were carved out for the private, 
funded pillar. In Hungary, the annual transition cost that remained after the parametric 
reform (which arose as a result of the diversion of contributions from the public system to 
the private accounts) was financed from general revenues (including taking on debts) and, 
depending on statistical rules, was significant: 1 to 2 per cent of GDP. 
During its 13-year-lifespan, and contrary to high expectations, the second pillar did not 
produce miracles nor did it constrain the fiscal binges of subsequent Hungarian 
governments. Among the important items of government overspending, increases in 
public pensions (most notably the step-by-step introduction of a 13th month benefit 
during 2003-2006 by the socialist-liberal coalition) played an important role. Although 
the re-elected coalition reduced the budget deficit to acceptable levels between 2006 and 
2008, the private debt to income ratio continued to grow – mostly from currency-
denominated, therefore risky, foreign credits. The international financial and economic 
crisis hit Hungary first and hard in October 2008. Logically, the austerity plan of 2009 
included a heavy reduction of short- and long-term pension expenditures. 
During the long years of opposition (2002 to 2010), the right-of-center Fidesz party 
permanently attacked the left-of-centre government’s popular as well as its unpopular 
measures: the former were too modest for the conservatives (in fact, they promised a 14th 
month benefit in 2006), the latter were too strict (“no need for austerity”). Partly due to 
this populistic political stance, the conservatives gained a supermajority in the parliament 
in May 2010. Rather than withdrawing their irresponsible promises, especially the 
introduction of a low, flat-rate personal income tax, the governing conservatives delivered 
on them. 
After some awkward trials, the conservatives decided to close down the mandatory 
private pillar. The main reason behind this move was to gain access to the financial 
resources that would permit tax cuts (personal and corporate income taxes) without 
                                                        
3 “Progressivity” means the following: if A worked half as much as B and each hour earned half of 
B’s wage, then A’s pension would be much higher than a quarter (1/21/2) of B’s pension. 
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 reducing public expenditures. Not content with the fact that pension contributions to the 
private second pillar pension associations (i.e. pension funds) have now become part of 
government revenues (equivalent to about 1.4 per cent of GDP), the government is willing 
to spend a large part of the nationalized capital of the pension associations for tax cuts. As 
a justification, they believe, or pretend to believe, in the high levels of financial risk 
associated with private pension investments and in the efficiency of the aforementioned 
tax cuts. While this article acknowledges the riskiness of pension investments, the 
economic risks of a mono-pillar pension system must be equally acknowledged. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of the tax reform can be contested and the abovementioned 
pension measures seriously threaten the future of the newly-enlarged public pension 
system. 
There is a relatively rich literature on the Hungarian “permanent” pension reform: 
Augusztinovics and Martos (1997), Palacios and Rocha (1998), Augusztinovics (1999), 
Simonovits (2001), Augusztinovics et al. (2002), Czúcz and Pintér (2002), Rocha and 
Vittas (2002), Gál and Tarcali (2003), Simonovits (2008) and (2011), Gál, Iwasaki and 
Széman (2008), Guardianchich (2008) and Holtzer, ed. (2010). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the pre-reform state 
of the Hungarian public pension system. This is followed by an introduction to the partial 
privatization of the Hungarian pension system and then a short history of the Hungarian 
second pillar between 1998 and 2010. The economic and political changes that lead to the 
destruction of the second pillar are then outlined and the consequences of these are drawn. 
An Appendix shows the relative gains of those returning to the mono-pillar system and the 
relative losses of those who stay in the second pillar. 
THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM UNTIL 1998 
We shall start our story by outlining the Hungarian pension system before 1998. 4 Hungary 
was (and is) an ageing country, with low fertility and relatively high age-specific adult 
mortality rates. As a result, the old-age dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of the number of 
old-aged [aged 65 or older] to that of working age [aged 15 to 64]) was about 40 per cent in 
1994 and is expected to rise to 52 per cent by 2030. This is not a particularly dramatic rise, 
                                                        
4 As additional background, Hungary is a middle-sized and middle-income country of some 10 
million inhabitants with PPP per-capita GDP of about 60 per cent of the EU-27 average in the 
foregoing period. By 1997, the bulk of the economy had been privatized and after reaching the 
trough of the transformational depression in the years 1993 to 1996, the country had been 
developing significantly more rapidly than the EU-15 until 2006. In May 2004, Hungary joined the 
European Union with nine other countries, mostly ex-communist states. During 2007 and 2008, its 
GDP all but stagnated and sharply declined during the crisis of 2009. 
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 especially when one takes account of the low full benefit (retirement) ages of 1994; namely, 
age 55 (women) and age 60 (men).  
During the communist era, Hungary had built up a relatively generous first pillar 
system, which was universal and was combined with a similarly public health care system 
(cf. Bokros and Dethier, 1998). By 1990, the ratio of public pension expenditures to GDP 
reached 10 per cent and has since remained around this value. (This is about the normal 
value in a mono-pillar system and is only about two-thirds of the peaks achieved in Poland 
or Italy.) As an important legacy of the communist system, the public pension system was 
highly progressive: higher earnings and longer employment increased the entry benefits 
much less than proportionally (see footnote 4), and as a consequence of the insufficient 
indexation of higher benefits, the value of the benefits in payment diminished 
progressively after retirement. 
During the transformation of the economy, the employment rate (for those aged 15-64) 
dropped drastically (from 76 per cent in 1989 to 58 per cent in 1995) and has barely 
increased since. This change adversely influenced the pension system from two sides: 
various groups in the labour force chose early retirement, particularly the unemployed and 
those working in the hidden economy, causing a significant increase in the number of 
pensioners, while simultaneously reducing the number of potential active contributors.  
A simple consequence of this process was the surge in the so-called “system dependency 
ratio”, that is, the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of workers, from 51 per 
cent to 84 per cent.5  
The consequence was direct: payroll tax rates had to be raised and benefit rates had to 
be cut.6 
The transition from socialism to capitalism was accompanied by a significant 
temporary drop in real earnings, although one part of this drop was simply transformed 
into capital incomes. The appearance of double-digit inflation made a switch to the wage 
indexation of pension benefits inevitable in 1992. While the indexation of pensions more 
or less ensured the relative income position of pensioners with respect to workers, the 
progressive benefit formula of the entry pensions gave rise to widespread under-reporting 
of earnings and shorter episodes of contribution/lower density of contribution payments. 
By 1995, a consensus had emerged: the Hungarian pension system needed reform. As 
is usual, there were two camps in Hungary: those who wanted to keep a pure public 
pension system by introducing parametric reforms (e.g. Augusztinovics and Martos, 1997) 
                                                        
5 One must underline that the system dependency ratio takes into account not only old-age 
pensioners, but survivor and disability beneficiaries as well. 
6 For example, in 1989 the previously differentiated contribution rates of 40-33-10 per cent were 
raised to a unified rate of 43 per cent; the replacement rate dropped from 66 per cent in 1990 to 59 
per cent in 1996. 
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 and those who wanted to replace at least a large part of the public system with a private 
(and funded) pillar (e.g. Palacios and Rocha, 1998). The former view was convinced that 
the parametric reforms of the first pillar system were not only necessary but sufficient. In 
contrast, and following the ideas of the World Bank (1994), the latter view did not accept 
the sufficiency of such reforms. Moderate privatizers considered that partial privatization 
was necessary to deflect public attention way from the parallel parametric reforms of the 
public system, while radical privatizers believed in the superiority of any private system 
over any public one, including pensions, education, health care and transportation.7 
In 1997, Hungary chose partial privatization. Since then, except for Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic (the two richest transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe), the 
bulk of the countries in the region have followed suit. Of note, the Czech Republic 
currently plans to introduce a modest voluntary second pillar. 
THE HUNGARIAN PENSION REFORM: 1998 
Here we will elaborate on the compressed account of the Hungarian pension reform 
offered in the Introduction. The law adopting private individual accounts was passed by 
Parliament in the summer of 1997 and implemented on January 1, 1998. Let us consider 
the parametric and systemic reforms separately. 
PARAMETRIC REFORMS 
By definition, the parametric reforms were confined to the public pillar. The simplest 
element of the parametric reform has been the fast increase, in 1997, of the “full benefit 
age” from age 60 to age 62 (men) by 2001, and progressively from age 55 to age 62 
(women) by 2008. The entry benefits of those who delay retirement beyond the full benefit 
age were raised significantly. Those who retire before reaching the full benefit age are to 
experience a significant reduction from 2013.8 
Since 1998, the progressivity of the entry benefit formula has been diminishing 
steadily. Between 2000 and 2009, the already-in-payment benefits were increased on the 
basis of combined wage-price indexation. From 2013 the system will include a 
proportional entry benefit, gross rather than net, with a uniform accrual of 1.65 per cent 
                                                        
7 Various transition scenarios are modeled and compared in Kotlikoff (1997), Simonovits (2003, 
Chapter 15), and Feldstein (2005). 
8 In the interim, it is to be noted that the rules of transition are so generous that the bulk of retirees 
who have a sufficiently-long work history still retire well in advance of the full benefit age with 
almost a full benefit entitlement. 
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 for the mono-pillar (or 1.22 per cent for the mixed system). After 40 years of employment, 
the resulting pre-tax, mono-pillar entry benefit will be 66 per cent of the reference gross 
wage. 
Systemic reforms 
From the point of view of this article, the systemic reforms are more spectacular than 
the parametric reforms. In 1998, Hungary, a pioneer among the ex-communist countries 
in this regard, partially privatized its first pillar system. Rather than adding a new pillar on 
top of the existing “first pillar” system, the government “carved out” a mandatory private 
pillar from the old system. For the members of the combined system, roughly one-quarter 
of the total mandatory contribution (8 per cent of the gross wage) was to be channelled 
into the private pillar while roughly three-quarters (or 23 per cent) was directed to the 
public pillar. 
The workers were free to join any private pension association and to switch 
associations at any time paying only minimal fees. As the private pillar was part of the 
mandatory system, the government monitored the operation of the private associations: its 
supervisory board (Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority) ensured that the pension 
associations complied with the legal regulations. Moreover, originally there was a 
government guarantee behind them that limited members’ loss to 6 per cent of the 
corresponding mono-pillar benefit. With time, this guarantee was discreetly withdrawn in 
2002, but re-established in another guise in 2009. 
Consistent with the mandatory character of the two-pillar system, after 15 years of 
participation the private pillar was also to pay retirees life annuities, to be computed on the 
basis of unisex life expectancy tables. Rather surprisingly, to make the private and the 
public entry benefits comparable, the law also required wage-price indexation of private 
life annuities, an impossible requirement. 
Rather than confining privatization to old-age pensions alone (as in Poland), 
proportional fractions of the disability and survivor pensions were also transferred into the 
private domain. Those who became disabled were given the option of returning to the 
mono-pillar system. If ever a member of a private pension association died before 
retirement, his or her designated heirs could have inherited the accumulated capital of the 
deceased. 
Participation in the mixed system was mandatory for those who entered the labour 
market after June 30, 1998, but optional for those who paid contributions to the first pillar 
system before 1998. Because of this, it would have taken decades before the mono-pillar 
system had disappeared completely. 
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 Although the socialist-liberal coalition government that introduced the reform 
preached the superiority of the private system over the public one, to save on transition 
costs it sought to confine participation in the mixed system primarily to younger cohorts. 
As an automatic tool for limiting participation, the government framed the transition rules 
so that subscribers to the mixed system lost about one-quarter of their contributions to the 
pre-reform system. About half of all workers joined the mixed system during the transition 
period, which lasted until August 31, 1999. These were drawn predominantly, but not 
exclusively, from younger cohorts. According to realistic projections, a significant part of 
those who joined the mixed system would have received lower total pensions than if they 
had stayed in the mono-pillar system, owing to the low efficiency of the private pillar 
(Simonovits, 2003, Table 5.2 and Figure 9.1). 
The most pressing question surrounding a reform such as this is always who will bear 
the costs of transition. By design, the reduction of the projected values of the mono-pillar 
and the first pillar benefits, i.e. the parametric reform, along with the voluntarily-accepted 
partial loss in benefits payable to the older entrants who joined the mixed system, would 
have resulted in a considerable saving in public pension expenditures. But these 
reductions would not have eliminated the temporary financing gap that had arisen 
between current contributions and benefits. The reform government made a promise to 
finance the cost of transition from general revenues (including debt finance). 
At the start, it was hoped that the partial privatization of the first pillar system would 
enhance compliance and draw workers out of the grey economy into the “world of labour”. 
It is true that participation in any mandatory system depends strongly on the perceived 
relation between individual costs and benefits (Kotlikoff, 1997) and both pillars were much 
more transparent than the old system had ever been. But it was naive to believe (if anyone 
actually did believe) that workers from the grey economy would suddenly report their total 
earnings: for the “privilege” of contributing a mere 8 per cent of covered earnings to the 
private pension fund, while they would have to pay over 50 per cent of their gross wages 
for various contributions and taxes. This is hardly an enticing proposition. But even if the 
entire first pillar system had been privatized as in Chile, poorer workers could still not 
have afforded any contribution (Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2005). 
We now turn to the most important pitfalls of the Hungarian (and other) structural 
pension reform(s), which became more and more transparent with the passage of time. 
i) It is not easy to harmonize a private pillar and a public pillar, especially in a set-up 
where the private pillar is dominated by the public one. How can the government 
expect workers to contribute fully to a lower quality but dominant first pillar and a 
higher quality but modest second pillar? The simple slogan used at the time of 
“security via diversification” could not solve this problem. 
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 ii) Private pension funds or “associations”, especially those based on individual 
rather than firm membership, have high operating costs. 
iii) There are very few countries with mandatory private life annuities, and probably 
no mandatory fund pays price-indexed unisex annuities.  
iv) It is obvious that during the transition the expenditures of the public pillar cannot 
be reduced as much as necessary to compensate for the loss of contributions that, 
henceforth, are directed to the private pillar (about 1.4 per cent of GDP in the 
2000s). Economists are divided whether this cost of transition is an integral part of 
the government budget or not (Beetsma and Oksanen, 2006, 588-589).  
THE SHORT HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN SECOND PILLAR 
(1998 TO 2010) 
Turning from the plans to reality, a reassessment of the Hungarian pension reform (Orbán 
and Palotai, 2005 and Simonovits, 2008) confirmed that the hopes of the reformers were 
not realized. On the one hand, the populist governments have not followed the original 
blueprints and rather than containing the public expenditures on pensions they enlarged 
them in a spectacular way. For example, they introduced a 13th month benefit, without 
ensuring the necessary financing. Between 1998 and 2006, wages increased much more 
rapidly than prices, and technical measures were needed to contain the relative pension 
dynamics. On the other hand, the substandard results of the private pension associations 
would have probably diminished the total benefits of the members relative to those of non-
members until 2050, unless operational costs had been contained in the long run. The 
most important steps in the history of the Hungarian second (and first) pillar(s) were as 
follows. 
The socialist-liberal coalition government passed the two-pillar mandatory system into 
law in the summer of 1997. The law came into effect on January 1, 1998. 
However, a new conservative government, which opposed the structural pension 
reform, came to power in May 1998. Its gradual efforts were geared to making the reform 
less popular. First it froze the contribution rate at 6 per cent, rather than raising it to 7 per 
cent in 1999 and 8 per cent in 2000 as it had been envisaged in the 1998 reform. 
Moreover, it used the transition cost as a pretext to cut back on public benefits, too. At the 
end of its four-year mandate, it made the return to the mono-pillar system possible; this 
became the default option in 2002. As a consequence, the guarantee was also eliminated. 
These measures already foreshadowed the drastic measures of 2010. 
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 The social-liberal coalition returned to power in 2002 and made entry into the mixed 
system mandatory again for newcomers to the labor market and opened entry into it for 
those younger than age 30. Forgetting the rules of fiscal prudence, it introduced the 13th 
month benefit, on a gradual basis, between 2003 and 2006 and, in the same period, raised 
the private contribution rate from 6 per cent to 8 per cent. Adding other popular 
programmes, the budget deficit and the current account deficit rose to untenable heights 
(both about 9 per cent of the GDP). 
Initially, there were numerous pension associations. Rapidly, however, the bulk (more 
than 90 per cent) of both capital and membership became concentrated in the six biggest 
firms, each connected with large financial institutions – banks or insurance companies. 
During a period of steady economic growth (1998-2004), on average the Hungarian 
private pillar paid a real interest rate of zero per cent (Matits, 2004) – if one does not 
neglect the operating costs proportional to contributions and assets, as was the case in 
Hungary. It took ten years for the government to enforce through regulation these costs to 
4.5 per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively. 
In 2004, Hungary entered the European Union (EU) and immediately was ordered to 
cut the budget deficit. The re-elected government successfully reduced the budget deficit 
from 9 per cent to 4 per cent between 2006 and 2008, but could not prevent firms or 
citizens from taking large private loans, mainly from abroad and in foreign denominations, 
especially in Swiss francs. As a result, the gross foreign debt ratio rose between 2004 and 
2007 by 24 per cent, out of which 18 percent falling to the private debts. Meanwhile the 
gross government debt continued to rise well beyond the sacrosanct 60%.9 
It is characteristic of the negligence of Hungarian governments that it did not occur to 
the authorities to incorporate the transition costs of privatization into government 
revenues until 2004. When Hungary and other reform countries (e.g. Sweden and Poland) 
made a formal request in 2004, the EU authorized only a corresponding reduction in the 
government budget deficit for five years and at a diminishing rate. 
Between 2007 and 2010, the pension associations were required to offer a range of 
portfolios, from conservative to aggressive growth funds, wherein the level of individual 
risk exposure was expected to decline as members approached retirement age. 
During the international financial and economic crisis the Hungarian pension 
associations (both mandatory and voluntary) suffered terrible losses, but these have since 
been mostly recovered. As a by-product of this temporary crisis, the then Socialist 
government opened the door to enable a voluntary return to the mono-pillar system for 
                                                        
9 See IMF and other statistics on the Hungarian accumulated foreign currency denominated private 
debts.  
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 those who were older than age 52 in 2009. It is worth recalling that members of older 
cohorts gave up one-quarter of their previous pension rights when they joined the mixed 
system, a loss that they have not been able to recover, especially in light of the turbulent 
global economy. As was expected, the pension associations also supported the voluntary 
return to the mono-pillar system, lest the first private retirees would be disappointed.  
Not understanding this issue, only half of the older members accepted this offer.10 
We now arrive at the most pressing problem of mandatory funded systems: the 
payment of unisex inflation-proof life annuities. It took 12 years in Hungary for the 
government to come up with a hybrid solution: to transform the pseudo pension funds  
(i.e. pension associations) working in the form of cooperatives into real funds (more 
precisely, specialized insurance institutions) and provide two alternative unisex life 
annuities:  
a) inflation-proof annuities, that were probably to be provided by the government; and  
b) risky life annuities, with only a nominal guarantee of subsequent benefits. 
Unfortunately, the then President of the Republic had misgivings about the correctness of 
this plan and sent it to the Constitutional Court just before the 2010 elections. 
When the international financial and economic crisis arrived, Hungary was hit hard. 
Only the conditional loans of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
saved the country from a complete financial meltdown. But these conditions required 
short-and long-term adjustments, including those in the pension system: elimination of 
the 13th month benefit; the replacement of wage-price indexation by, essentially, price 
indexation; and raising the full-benefit retirement age (men and women) from age 62 to 
age 65 between 2012 and 2018, in fact, between 2014 and 2024. 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SECOND PILLAR 
For a long time, it was an open question what the new government would do with the 
economy after the conservative Fidesz party gained 68 per cent of the seats in the 
parliament at the elections in April 2010. In opposition (between 2002 and 2010), the 
conservatives opposed every restriction (austerity measures) in general and voted against 
the elimination of the 13th month benefit in 2009 in particular.11 The new government 
could hardly leave the path of “superfluous restrictions” started in 2006 by the socialist-
                                                        
10 Among the other half of member that remained was the present economic minister, who executed 
the “nationalization” of the pension associations at the end of 2010. 
11 Note, however, that in a “hidden” television interview, as the leader of the then opposition, Orbán 
admitted that there was no way to re-establish the 13th month benefit in the near future. 
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 liberal government and it was equally difficult to admit that they “did not know” what they 
were talking about regarding the superfluous restrictions while being in the opposition. 
At the beginning of June 2010, the new government tried to increase its room for 
manoeuvre. The new prime minister, Viktor Orbán, wanted to increase the maximum 
permitted budget deficit in terms of GDP from the earlier 3.8 per cent to 7.5 per cent, but – 
and also because of the impact of the Greek crisis and the permanent overspending of 
Hungary – the European Commission insisted on the original deficit ceiling and Hungary 
had to accept the conditions. To reduce the immediate pressure on public finances, the 
government discontinued its relationship with the IMF, though the country must still 
repay the conditional loans (about 13 billion euros) in the coming years. 
In August 2010, together with eight other EU countries, Hungary asked the EU to 
modify its earlier decisions of 2005 and take into full account the transition costs of 
pension privatization in the budget deficit and the government debt. The rapid EU 
decision was a conditional “yes” and “no”: yes for Poland, with a lower government debt 
ratio; and no for Hungary, with a higher government debt ratio.12 
At the same time, the Hungarian Constitutional Court largely upheld the previous 
government’s original plan for the transformation of pension associations into genuine 
pension funds. During the summer of 2010, it appeared that the ruling conservatives 
would have to extricate themselves from the trap they set for their opponents. Events, 
however, took a different turn. 
Most notably, in mid-October 2010, Prime Minister Orbán announced a spectacular 
personal income tax reform, making the formerly quite progressive tax schedule almost 
linear and low (ending with a rate of 16 per cent), between 2010 and 2013. Like President 
Reagan in the United States in the 1980s, the Hungarian Prime Minister seems to believe 
that these measures will raise the GDP growth rate from 3 per cent to 5 per cent in only 
three years and increase the activity rate from 60 per cent to 80 per cent in ten years. 
Furthermore, there is an expectation that generous tax credits for families with three 
children will raise the total fertility rate from 1.3 to 1.7. To finance the reduction of the 
personal and corporate income tax and further delay much needed cuts in public spending 
(which is still equivalent to about 50 per cent of GDP, and thus much higher than that of 
other similar countries), the new government levied massive extraordinary taxes on 
competitive firms and banks. The extraordinary taxes will constraint future growth.  
Between May and October of 2010, there were already rumours on the Web that the 
new government was considering the reduction or elimination of the second pillar and 
                                                        
12 Strangely enough, the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have already 
temporarily suspended the transfer of contributions to private pension funds, alleviating budget 
tensions. 
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 these rumours were never refuted. Moreover, according to reliable private sources, the EU 
and the IMF “openly” opposed the government’s plans on nationalization. Such a 
nationalization increases the actual maximum permitted budget deficit by 1.4 per cent of 
GDP and the released accumulated capital of the pension associations promises an easy 
bounty.  
After a long suspense, on October 13 2010, Prime Minister Orbán announced the 
temporary suspension of the transfer of the private contributions to the associations 
(through the Hungarian Tax Authority) for 14 months and the right of insured workers to 
voluntarily return to the mono-pillar system. Without any discussion, the supermajority of 
parliament voted for these laws with long-lasting effects. Two weeks later, the prime 
minister took the next step and announced the de facto closing down of the private 
pension associations forever. Although members were “allowed” to stay in the mixed 
system and contribute 10 per cent rather than 8 per cent to their private associations, the 
remaining members were in turn obligated to renounce their rights to all their hard-
earned contributions (at a rate of 24 per cent of gross wages) that would have accrued in 
the public pillar after 2011. The members were given two months (including two weeks 
around Christmas) to decide. An Appendix provides simplified calculations on the relative 
gains for returning to the mono-pillar system and the relative losses of staying in the 
private pillar as a function of the current age. For example, a typical worker of current age 
40 gains 5 per cent of the mono-pillar benefit by returning, while he or she loses 40 per 
cent of the mono-pillar benefit by staying. The letter of the new law would take away even 
the disability, survivor and health care benefits of those staying in the second pillar but 
probably the lawmaker will eliminate this glaring anomaly. 
In line with the tenets of behavioural economics, the government made the automatic 
return or entry into the mono-pillar system the default option. Moreover, those returning 
to the mono-pillar system and who have positive real returns on their accounts (the 
difference between the real values of the pension capital and of the total contributions, for 
every worker), can collect these returns; those with negative real returns will be 
compensated on their public accounts for these losses. For the entire country, there were 
only 30 designated points of contact where those members who wished to stay in the pure 
second pillar could personally and formally re-affirm their intention to do so. In the end, 3 
per cent of the membership decided to remain in the pure second pillar, most of them 
deciding at the last minute. Since most remaining members are young, they may believe 
that they have enough time to wait for the eventual reversal of the law. It is characteristic 
of the government’s cynicism that the official evaluation of this outcome was that the great 
majority of the ex-pension association members supported the government by “choosing” 
the mono-pillar system. On the other hand, if the mandatory private pillar had been 
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 extremely efficient and attractive, then the 3 million members could have organized mass 
demonstrations against the government decision and could have compelled the 
government to renounce its decision. 
To date, there would appear to have been no formal estimation of the fiscal 
implications of the reform, let alone how the administration will manage the challenges 
arising from the dual programmes within the mono-pillar system. For example, the 
remaining pension wealth of the pension associations may be 10 per cent rather than 3 per 
cent of the total (more than 3 times the per capita average), i.e. equal to about 1 per cent of 
the GDP. There are estimates that the total of positive real returns may amount to 1 per 
cent of GDP. Moreover, the nationalized pension capital (9 per cent rather than the 
original 11 per cent of GDP) will be used not only for a reduction of the budget deficit (5 
per cent of GDP), but for making room for a radical tax cut (cc. 4 per cent of GDP during 
three years). Finally, the implicit government debt will be increased by the gains in future 
pension entitlements of those returning to the mono-pillar. 
In anticipating the opposition’s application to the Constitutional Court in the defence 
of the private pension accounts, the government has already curtailed a substantial part of 
the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, making any legal reversal illusory.  
The government has sacrificed the future on the altar of the present. Once more, the future 
of the Hungarian pension system looks dark. 
It is worth remembering that the Polish government also drastically reduced, but did 
not eliminate the contributions to, the second pillar in December 2010. In this case, the EU 
promised to tolerate Polish practice, effectively saving the Polish second pillar from 
destruction. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, a number of observations can be presented. Partial privatization of a mature 
and universal public system is feasible even in middle-income countries like Hungary and 
other ex-communist countries. Judging by the number of affiliates who joined voluntarily 
(about half of the workforce), such a transition can be quite popular, at least for a while. 
Individuals, however, may not understand fully the disadvantages of joining the mixed 
system – in Hungary, those who joined the pension associations voluntarily ceded one-
quarter of their previously-gained pension rights. From the perspective of employers, with 
the support of ITC technologies, even small firms are able to direct the monthly private 
contributions of their workers to various funds and well-developed pension funds are able 
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 to invest even these relatively small individual contributions (equivalent to around USD 80 
per month). 
For reforms to be accepted as legitimate by the population, pension promises need to 
be kept. No less important is the appropriate regulation and good governance of the 
pension system. An often-cited argument in favour of creating private pension pillars is to 
diversify risk, including reducing political risk. 
However, governments can also target the accumulated capital of pension funds as a 
source of finance to bankroll projects without having to raise personal income tax rates or 
reduce public expenditures. This temptation may be especially strong in times of crises 
when short-terms needs overshadow long-terms objectives. 
From this perspective, Hungary is a typical case how not to do pension reforms and 
counter-reforms. 
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 APPENDIX: RELATIVE GAINS AND LOSSES 
This Appendix calculates the relative gains13 of those individuals who return to the mono-
pillar system and the corresponding losses of those who stay in the second pillar as a 
function of age, pessimistically assuming that the present discriminatory law remains valid 
until all the participants die. (Nevertheless, we assume that nobody, who stays in the 
private pillar, loses his or her already acquired rights even if he or she had less than 15 or 
20 years of employment by 2010.) To avoid the excessive complexity of the reform and 
counter-reform, we greatly simplify the situation. We concentrate on a wage earner who 
always earns the nationwide average or its scalar. Assuming that the efficiency of the 
private pillar is the same as that of the public, we need the following notations: the dates of 
start and of the end of the second pillar: T 1 = 1998 and T2 = 2010. Our fictitious hero had 
age A in T2, i.e. he was born in year T2  – A, started  to work in year T2  – A + L, and retired 
in year T2  – A + L + R. We only consider those who were members of private pension 
associations in 2010, i.e. T2  – A + L + R > T2 , i.e.  A < L + R. We distinguish those who 
worked in T1 or not: either T2  – A + L <T1 or T2  – A + L  T1 , i.e. either  A > T2  – T1 + L or A 
 T2  – T1 + L. 
What is the expected gain for somebody who returns to the mono-pillar system? He or 
she recoups 0.25 times his or her annual pension during the pre-reform years, their 
numbers being (T1 – T2  + A – L)+ , where subindex + denotes the positive part of a real 
number. This gain is to be compared to the unit mono pension, accruing for R years. In 
formula: 
G = 0.25(T1   – T2  + A – L)+ /R. 
What is the expected loss for somebody who stays in the private pillar? On the one 
hand, he or she renounces his or her gains accruing from the annulled losses mentioned 
above. On the other hand, he or she suffers new losses, renouncing 0.7 times of the mono-
pillar pension rights earned in the years of the counter-reform, their number being L + R – 
A.  In formula: 
V = G + 0.7(L + R – A )/R . 
The relative values of the gains of returning and the losses of staying are given in Table 
A1. 
                                                        
13 This gain is the annulled losses suffered by joining voluntarily the mixed system in 1998-1999, when any 
worker ceded one-quarter of his previous pension rights. The positive real returns cannot be modelled at 
the moment. 
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Table A1. 
 Current age, gain and loss 
    Current  Gain from Loss  
    age  returning       of staying  
    (year)  (%)  (%) 
25           0.0     61.3 
30           0.0     52.5 
35           1.9      45.6 
40           5.0      40.0 
45           8.1      34.4 
50        11.3      28.8 
55        14.4      23.1 
60        17.5      17.5 
 
It can be seen that by raising the current age from 30 to 60, the relative gain increases 
steeply, from zero to 17.5 per cent of the mono-pillar benefit. The relative loss of staying in 
the private pillar decreases with the current age: it is 61 per cent for those aged 25 and 17.5 
per cent for those aged 60, the latter being equal to the gain of returning. 
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